easy instrumentation. Monitors in Pal are independent of the programs they are used to instrument, and work irrespective of whether recursion is present. While they are theoretically only as expressive as monitors in Blast in the absence of recursion, they are more modular, succinct and comprehensible even in this case. We believe, therefore, that these monitors present an example of structured specifications, suitable for structured programs. Finally, while our monitors extend the specification format of a model checker, their use is not limited to static checking. Once a program has been instrumented with a monitor, it can be used for testing or run-time verification as well as static analysis or model checking.
Language description
We present the Pal language using an ex- A Pal monitor for this requirement is shown in Fig. 1 . The states of the monitor are encoded by a set of monitor variables, and its transitions by a set of event{...} blocks. Some monitor variables are global and are declared using the keyword globalintuitively, global monitor variables may be tested or updated by any event. In addition, each event includes an optional set of local monitor variables, declared using the keyword local, whose scope is restricted to the current event.
Events are fired by matching patterns on statements in the analyzed program. A pattern, specified in a pattern{...} block, is an assignment or procedure call with possible "pattern variables" ($?, $1, $2, etc.). During matching, the variables $1, $2, etc. match arbitrary C expressions and the variable $? serves as a wildcard-e.g., the pattern in event 1 matches all calls to fopen. For each statement matching the pattern 1 specified in the i-th event, the monitor sets up a precondition and a postcondition using the code in the blocks before{...} and after{...} in this event. The precondition (similarly, postcondition) checks whether an optional guard-a C expression over monitor and pattern variables, inside a guard{...} block-is satisfied by the monitor state right before (after) this statement. If the guard is not satisfied, an assertion violation is reported. Otherwise, the state of the monitor is updated by executing the C code contained within an optional action{...} block. This code is allowed to read pattern variables, and read or update monitor variables. For succinctness, we allow guards and actions to be defined outside before or after blocks (event 1 or 2)-in this case they are assumed to define preconditions. an event's precondition and postcondition are respectively injected before and after statements matching its pattern. Consider a call x = foo(y) in a procedure bar in a program; on instrumentation using the monitor in Fig. 1 , this line is replaced by the chunk of code in Fig. 2 . Declarations of the monitor variables are added as well; stored is declared locally in bar, and infoo, open, and stream are declared globally.
Note that this syntax closely resembles that of the Blast query language. Blast, too, allows injection of code before or after a program statement using the keywords before and after. This similarity is a design feature, as our goal was to extend Blast minimally to obtain a specification language for contextsensitive requirements. The key new features in Pal are local variables and the ability to declare before and after blocks in the same event. This modification makes a major semantic difference: the control-flow of a monitor is now given by a nested word automaton, rather than a word automaton. Consider our example monitor and an execution of the input program containing a call to foo. In the nested word capturing this execution, there is a jump-edge from the call to foo to its matching return. Now, as the monitor reads this execution, it can save its state right before control enters foo using its local variables, and retrieve this state at the matching return. Thus, it has the power of a nested word automaton that reads the corresponding nested word, consulting its state at the source of an incoming jump-edge while transitioning to a return position. On the other hand, our monitor can use its global variables to pass states into invoked procedures such as foo, just like a Blast monitor. More abstractly, this amounts to state updates as it reads the underlying word structure.
We end this section with some hints to check that the monitor in Fig. 1 specifies our original requirement. The variables infoo and open track whether foo is in the stack and whether dat is open, and stream stores a possible open stream for dat. The variable stored is used to infer whether control is back to the top-level context calling foo. The rest is easily verified.
Implementation and case studies
We have implemented Pal on top of the current implementation of Blast. The specification and analysis modules in Blast are orthogonal: the former generates C code instrumented with a monitor, while the latter checks the generated code for assertion failures. We extend Blast's specification module to permit Pal monitors, and analyze the generated code statically as well as dynamically. The source code of our implementation, along with the examples that we now discuss, is available at http://www.cis.upenn.edu/~swarat/tools/pal.tar.gz.
File descriptor leak in fcron A monitor as in Sec. 2 could be used to prevent a reported bug (http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2004-1033) in Version 2.9.4 of fcron, a periodic command scheduler for Linux. Here, the main function of a binary (fcrontab) calls a routine parseopt, which calls a routine is allowed to check if a user is "allowed", which calls a procedure that opens, but forgets to close, a stream for a secret file fcron.allow. After control returns to the main context, the program starts a process with a name derived from an environment variable. However, an attacker can change the value of this variable to start a malicious program that reads fcron.allow via the open file stream.
This error may be prevented by a policy that allows parseopt to open fcron.allow, but not to leak its descriptor. Also, we could require that this secret file is not opened outside the scope of parseopt. This policy makes intuitive sense: as parseopt is a routine verifying a username, it is reasonable that it, or procedures it calls transitively, opens the file of allowed users. However, by the principle of least privilege, this file should only be opened when necessary, i.e., when parseopt is on the stack. A monitor expressing these requirements looks very similar to the one in Fig. 1 . On instrumenting fcron with this monitor, we find a policy violation within a few random tests. However, abstraction-based model checking using Blast is not suitable for this example, as Blast cannot currently perform good analysis of library functions like strcmp.
Stack-sensitive security properties Consider the security property: "A program must not execute a sensitive operation write at any point when an untrusted routine foo is on the stack." In the Java and C# languages, such policies are automatically enforced by the run-time environment, using the mechanism of stack inspection. In C, they may be enforced dynamically using a monitorhowever, traditional monitors cannot express such properties of the stack, so that a nested word monitor is needed. Of course, such monitors could also be used in static analysis or software model checking. Fig. 3 shows a monitor for this property. The global variable infoo tracks if foo is in the stack, and a guard prevents writes within the scope of foo.
We note that Pal may also be used to state some requirements of this nature that cannot be enforced via stack inspection. Consider the property: "If an untrusted procedure has ever been on the stack, a certain sensitive operation must not be executed." The rationale is that an untrusted routine may cause a side-effect that proves to be dangerous at a future point, so that if we call one, we must strengthen the security policy. However, since the culpable routine may no longer be on the stack when a violation occurs, stack inspection does not help in this case. On the other hand, it is easy to state such properties in Pal; code for a sample monitor is available on our webpage. ing logging policies enforced in large development efforts such as Windows. Consider the property: "Whenever a procedure returns an error value, the error must be logged via a routine log before control leaves the current procedural context." Now, different development groups may call log via different wrapper functions; however, the logging policy is fixed across groups and thus independent of the wrappers. In order to track if control has returned from a wrapper to the original context, we need a Pal monitor.
While we do not have access to industrial code bases where such policies are most natural, we have applied a Pal monitor for this property on a couple of hand-coded examples. These may be downloaded from our webpage.
